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323 
NOTES 
 
 
TEXAS ELECTIVE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION:  
A MODEL OF INNOVATION?  
 
ABSTRACT 
Workers' Compensation is often described as a bargain between 
employers and employees. Employees give up the right to sue their 
employers in negligence for workplace injuries, and, in return, employers 
agree to pay predictable, statutorily mandated benefits to injured 
employees. Over time, this “bargain” became compulsory in every state 
but one. Texas is the only state in which employers and employees can 
decide whether or not to enter the workers' compensation bargain. This 
elective system has some fairly serious problems, and many have 
advocated its abandonment. This Note analyzes the system's history, 
compares the system to conventional compulsory systems, analyzes some 
of its weaknesses, and concludes that with some modifications, the system 
could be a useful model for other states interested in fostering innovation 
and cost reduction in their own occupational injury systems. This 
conclusion is based on the experience of a small but significant number of 
Texas employers that opt out of the workers' compensation system and yet 
provide, at a lower cost, substantially the same benefits to injured 
employees as would be available under workers' compensation. The 
existence of this parallel occupational injury system directly benefits those 
employers that are able to construct cost-saving alternative benefit 
programs. In addition, it has the potential to indirectly benefit even those 
employers that participate in the workers' compensation system as cost 
saving techniques innovated in the less regulated occupational injury 
benefits market trickle into the more highly-regulated workers' 
compensation market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Texas is the only state that has an elective workers’ compensation 
system.1  The system has some fairly serious problems, and many have 
advocated its abandonment.2 This Note analyzes the system’s history, 
compares the system to the conventional compulsory systems that every 
other state has, analyzes some of the system’s weaknesses, and concludes 
that with some modifications, the system could be a useful model for other 
states interested in fostering innovation and cost reduction in their own 
occupational injury systems. This conclusion is based on the experience of 
a small but significant number of Texas employers that opt out of the 
workers’ compensation system, and yet provide, at a lower cost, 
substantially the same benefits to injured employees as would be available 
under workers’ compensation.3 The existence of this parallel benefit 
program presently benefits individual employers who can construct such 
programs and benefit from their cost savings. It also has the potential to 
benefit even those employers that participate in the workers’ 
compensation system, as cost saving techniques innovated in the less 
regulated occupational injury benefits market trickle into the more highly 
regulated workers’ compensation market.4 
This Note is organized into five parts. Part I outlines the historical 
development of a no fault workers’ compensation system in this country 
that came to replace common law employer's liability actions as the 
principal recourse for injured employees.5 Part I also discusses how 
workers’ compensation became compulsory in every state in the union 
except for Texas.6 Part II explains Texas's unique workers’ compensation 
system and includes a discussion of the different options Texas employers 
have for providing benefits to injured workers. Part II also chronicles a 
history of different types of abuses by non-subscribing employers and the 
Texas legislature's response to each type of abuse. Part II additionally 
discusses how non-subscribing employers are using the Federal 
Arbitration Act to preempt a Texas statute that forbids employers from 
                                                 
1 See infra note 97 and accompanying text (comparing Texas’s system to other 
states). 
2 See discussion infra Part II.C (describing the impact of waiver and arbitration 
provisions). 
3 See infra Part II (discussing Texas’s workers’ compensation system). 
4 See discussion infra Part III (detailing workers’ compensation risk financing). 
5 See infra Part I.C.i-iii (chronicling the shift to a workers’ compensation system). 
6 See infra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing Texas’s workers’ 
compensation system and its comparison to other states). 
326         WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW     [Vol. 2:323 
 
obtaining pre-injury claim waivers from their employees. Part III discusses 
the basic risk financing methods used in workers’ compensation. Part IV 
explains the two basic ways employers can save money by opting out of 
the workers’ compensation system, namely, assuming the risk of 
negligence claims and heading off negligence claims by providing an 
alternative benefit plan. Part V discusses the benefits of elective workers’ 
compensation. It argues that an elective system of workers’ compensation 
offers employers an opportunity to simultaneously save money and create 
new ways to provide benefits comparable to those of the workers’ 
compensation system. The conclusion begins by noting that in order to 
expand Texas-style elective workers’ compensation to other states, 
Congress must first amend the Federal Arbitration Act to prevent its 
preemption of state anti-waiver statutes in the employment contract 
context.7 It proceeds to list some other more minor improvements that the 
system would require before any other states would consider adopting an 
elective system. Ultimately this Note concludes that with these 
modifications, and with Congressional action on the Federal Arbitration 
Act, elective workers’ compensation would provide states and employers a 
competitive advantage. 
 
I. HISTORY OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION  
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
A. The Negligence Liability System 
 
Prior to the advent of modern workers’ compensation statutes, 
employees injured on the job had no guaranteed benefits.8 An injured 
employee's only recourse after an injury was to sue his employer under 
common law negligence.9 Under the negligence regime, employers were 
required to exercise due care, which included hiring suitable and sufficient 
coworkers, establishing and enforcing proper rules of conduct, providing a 
safe workplace and safe equipment, and providing warnings and suitable 
instructions in dangerous working conditions.10 An injured employee that 
could prove a breach of this duty of due care was entitled, at least in 
theory, to full compensation for his injuries, including medical expenses, 
                                                 
7 See infra notes 150-54 for a discussion of the FAA’s role in this context. 
8 E.g., PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE 
WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 28 (2000). 
9 E.g., id. at 28-29; JACK B. HOOD ET AL., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND 
EMPLOYEE PROTECTION LAWS 1-2 (3d ed. 1999). 
10 See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 30; HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 1-2.  
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lost wages, and pain and suffering.11 In addition to this post-injury 
remedy, employees in riskier jobs would theoretically earn higher wages 
than those employed in lower risk employments, a theoretical “risk 
premium.”12 Employees earning a risk premium could, in theory, use this 
extra money to purchase personal accident insurance.13 As a practical 
matter, however, there is little evidence of correlation between riskier jobs 
and higher wages during the years preceding the workers’ compensation 
era.14 
Under the negligence liability system, employers had three defenses: 
the so-called “unholy trinity”15 of assumption of risk, negligence of a 
fellow servant, and contributory negligence on the part of the injured 
employee.16 The assumption of risk defense was far reaching; it provided a 
defense against negligence claims by an employee when an accident arose 
either from factors ordinary to the type of work the employee did or, in the 
case of an extraordinary risk, if such extraordinary risk was acceptable to 
the employee when he took the job.17 The fellow servant defense barred 
recovery by an employee for injuries caused by the negligence of a co-
employee.18 Some suggest that this defense, which prevented liability of 
an employee to accrue to the employer despite the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, had as its justification an assumption of risk theory, whereby the 
employee assumed the risk of injury by a co-employee's negligence as one 
of the ordinary risks of employment in general.19 The contributory 
negligence defense barred recovery by an employee whose injury was to 
any extent a result of his own negligence, even if the employer had been 
more negligent.20 It is not hard to imagine how difficult it would be to 
                                                 
11 FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 30. 
12 Id. at 31. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 49. 
15 PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 7 
(1998). 
16 E.g., FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 30; HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 2-5; 
1 JAMES J. LORIMER ET AL., THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF INSURANCE 322 (1st ed. 1978). 
17 E.g., FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 30; HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 4-5; 
LORIMER ET AL., supra note 16.  
18 E.g., FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 31; HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 2-3; 
LENCSIS, supra note 16, at 7. 
19 E.g., HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 2-3; LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 7.  
20 E.g., FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 31; HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 4; 
LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 7. The history described here predates the rise of comparative 
negligence as a replacement for contributory negligence. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Balentine, 
833 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tenn. 1992).  
328         WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW     [Vol. 2:323 
 
prevail on a negligence claim with the foregoing defenses available to 
their fullest extent.  
 
B. Workers’  Compensation 
 
Before proceeding to the transition in this country from a negligence 
liability system to a workers’ compensation system, it is important to 
understand both what workers’ compensation is and how it is different 
from the negligence liability system. The most fundamental difference 
between the two systems is that unlike the negligence system, injured 
employees are entitled to compensation under the workers’ compensation 
system without respect to fault or negligence.21 The threshold inquiry is 
not whether the employer was negligent but rather whether the employee's 
injury arose out of and in the course of employment.22 The workers’ 
compensation system is often described as a bargain,23 or a quid pro quo,24 
between employers and employees. 
Under a workers’ compensation system, employers lose all of their 
common law defenses, and must pay benefits even when they were in no 
                                                                                                                         
Between 1920 and 1969, a few states began utilizing the principles of 
comparative fault in all tort litigation. See C. Mutter, Moving to 
Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for 
Tennessee, 57 Tenn. L. Rev. [sic] 199, 227 n.127 (1990). Then, 
between 1969 and 1984, comparative fault replaced contributory 
negligence in 37 additional states. Id. at 228. In 1991, South Carolina 
became the 45th state to adopt comparative fault, see Nelson v. 
Concrete Supply Co. [sic], 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991), 
leaving Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee 
as the only remaining common law contributory negligence 
jurisdictions.  
Id. (footnote omitted).  
21 E.g., LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9.  
22 See, e.g., TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.011(10) (West 2009) (“‘Compensable 
injury’ means an injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for 
which compensation is payable under this subtitle.”) (emphasis added); 1-3 LEX K. 
LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 3.01 (2009); see also LENCSIS, 
supra note 15, at 35-40 (distinguishing and explaining “arising out of” and “in the course 
of”). See generally HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 60-69 (defining “in the course of 
employment” and discussing employment scenarios involving risk sufficient to satisfy 
“arose out of” criteria). 
23 Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’ 
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 800-01 (1982). 
24 LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9. 
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way at fault.25 In exchange, employers benefit from the sole remedy 
doctrine, meaning that they are no longer liable in negligence for any 
injury that is compensable under the workers’ compensation statute.26 
Additionally, the benefits employers must pay under workers’ 
compensation statutes are predictable, as the statutes mandate them, and 
they are typically less than the amount for which employers would be 
liable in a successful negligence suit, at least with respect to lost wages 
and non-economic damages.27 Employers remain liable under a workers’ 
compensation system for all of an injured employee's medical expenses.28 
On the other hand, the amount employers must pay for lost wages is 
typically limited by either a dollar amount cap or a cap calculated as a 
percentage of the statewide average weekly wage.29 Moreover, employers 
are typically not liable under workers’ compensation statutes for so-called 
non-economic damages like pain and suffering and loss of consortium.30 
On the employee side of the bargain, employees give up their right to 
sue,31 and consequently their right to recover certain types of damages, 
such as lost wages over the statutory cap and non-economic damages like 
pain and suffering.32 In return for giving up these two birds in the bush, 
                                                 
25 HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 27. 
26 Id. at 26-27; LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9-10; see also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 
§ 408.001(a) (West 2009) (offering Texas’s statutory articulation of the sole remedy 
doctrine); 1-1 LARSON, supra note 22, at § 1.01 (describing a “typical” workers’ 
compensation act, including implementation of the sole remedy doctrine and 
accompanying elimination of negligence analysis). 
27 See LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9-10, 52-53 (discussing the guarantee of 
compensation and the corresponding tradeoff of full recovery for the employee); 1-1 
LARSON, supra note 22, at § 1.03 (describing the limitation of compensation under 
worker’s compensation to “disability”). 
28 E.g., HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 93; LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 51. In Texas, 
“[a]n employee who sustains a compensable injury is entitled to all health care 
reasonably required by the nature of the injury as and when needed.” TEX. LAB. CODE 
ANN. § 408.021(a) (West 2009) (emphasis added).  
29 E.g., HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 97-98; LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 52-54. “A 
weekly temporary income benefit may not exceed 100 percent of the state average 
weekly wage.” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.061. 
30 E.g., LARSON, supra note 22, at § 1.03. 
31 There are exceptions to this general rule, such as for injuries sustained outside of 
the employer/employee relationship and instances in which the employer commits an 
intentional tort. See LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 35-40, for a discussion of the “arising out 
of and in the course of employment” scope of workers’ compensation. 
32 See LARSON, supra note 22, at § 1.03 (discussing the amount of compensation and 
limits on types of damages such as pain and suffering); LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9 
(describing the tradeoffs for guaranteed compensation under workers’ compensation 
schemes, including loss of pain and suffering damages). 
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employees receive a statutory bird in the hand. This comes in the form of 
an entitlement to mandated benefits almost any time they suffer injury on 
the job, without the need to sue or prove negligence.33 Finally, in theory, 
both sides benefit from the reduced need for litigation, at least as to the 
question of negligence.  
 
C. The Shift to Workers’  Compensation 
 
Workers’ Compensation systems began to appear in Europe in the 
1880s.34 The shift from negligence liability systems to workers’ 
compensation systems occurred quickly in this country; in just one decade, 
from 1910 to 1920, forty-three states adopted workers’ compensation 
statutes, including Texas in 1913.35 Today, every state in the United States 
has a workers’ compensation system.36 Fishback and Kantor conclude that 
no single factor led to this rapid adoption, but rather that it arose due to a 
convergence of interests between employers, labor, and insurance 
companies.37 In other words, workers’ compensation was able to catch on 
so quickly because all of the major stakeholders in the workers’ 
compensation debate wanted it, and there were essentially no major 
players remaining to oppose it.38 
 
1. Employers 
 
It may at first seem strange that employers would favor a move to 
workers’ compensation. In order to understand this position, it is important 
to understand the shifting legal environment of the late 1800s and early 
                                                 
33 LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 9. 
34 See Samuel B. Horovitz, Worldwide Workmen’s Compensation Trends, 59 KY. 
L.J. 37, 40-41 (1970) (listing Germany in 1884, Austria in 1887, Norway in 1894, 
Finland in 1895, Denmark, France, and Italy in 1898, Greece in 1901, Belgium and 
Russia in 1903); see also Phil Hardberger, Texas Workers’ Compensation: A Ten Year 
Survey–Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 4 (2000) 
(denoting the adoption of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897 in Great Britain); 
Epstein, supra note 23, at 797 (describing the influence of the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act of 1897 on the United States system); HOOD ET AL., supra note 9, at 7 (noting 
adoption of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897 in Great Britain). 
35 FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 58. 
36 LORIMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 322; Horovitz, supra note 34, at 41; see also 
LARSON, supra note 22, at § 2.08 (explaining that Hawaii was the final state to adopt a 
workers' compensation system in 1963). 
37 FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 113. 
38 See id. at 89, 112-13.  
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1900s. Labor's political strength was growing during this period.39 With 
this increased clout, labor was successful in lobbying state legislatures to 
pass statutory reforms in employer's liability, including statutory limit-
ations on employers’ common law defenses.40 For example, in 1887, the 
Massachusetts legislature limited the fellow-servant defense by making 
any supervisory workers vice-principals of the employer, meaning that a 
supervisor’s negligence was no longer a defense to an employer’s liability 
claim.41 Massachusetts went even further in 1909 when it replaced 
contributory negligence with comparative negligence.42 This meant that an 
employee's claim was no longer barred by his own contributory neg-
ligence, but was merely reduced by the amount of his own negligence.43 
Between 1900 and 1911, the number of states with employer’s liability 
laws that restricted one or more of the common law defenses increased 
from seven to twenty-three.44 
In addition to these statutory limitations, the courts in some states were 
also beginning to limit employers’ common law defenses.45 For example, 
in Green v. Western American Co., the Washington Supreme Court 
limited the assumption of risk and contributory negligence defenses in 
cases involving a risk that the injured employee had previously brought to 
his employer’s attention.46 Green involved a mineworker who had 
requested timber to prop a section of a mine.47 The plaintiff’s supervisor 
informed him that there was no timber available and that he should return 
to work.48 The court held that in light of the fact that the employer was 
statutorily required to have enough timber on hand for propping mines and 
that the plaintiff had advised his supervisor of the need for timber to prop 
                                                 
39 Id. at 89. 
40 See id. at 94-95; see also J.E. Rhodes, The Inception of Workmen’s Compensation 
in the United States, 11 ME. L. REV. 35, 37-38 (1917) (noting the passage and effect of 
the English Employer’s Liability Act); LARSON, supra note 22, at § 2.05 (discussing 
Employer’s Liability Acts starting with the English Employer’s Liability Act of 1880); 
Epstein, supra note 23, at 787-97 (noting the English Employer’s Liability Act that 
imposed a qualified form of negligence liability on employers). 
41 E.g., FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 94. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 96-97. 
46 Green v. W. Am. Co., 70 P. 310, 320 (1902). 
47 Id. at 311. 
48 Id. 
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the mine, the plaintiff had not assumed the risk.49 The court then pro-
ceeded to consider contributory negligence and observed: 
 
Assumption of risk and contributory negligence approximate where the 
danger is so obvious and imminent that no ordinarily prudent man 
would assume the risk of injury therefrom. But where the danger, 
though present and appreciated, is one which many men are in the habit 
of assuming, and which prudent men who must earn a living are willing 
to assume for extra compensation, one who assumes the risk cannot be 
said to be guilty of contributory negligence if, having in view the risk 
of danger assumed, he uses care reasonably commensurate with the risk 
to avoid injurious consequences.50 
 
The court later remanded the case for trial because the jury had not 
considered the question of whether the plaintiff’s care was commensurate 
with the risk.51  
The legislative and judicial trend toward restricting the common law 
defenses available to employers led to uncertainty about the extent of 
employer’s liability.52 This uncertainty led to increased litigation.53 In fact, 
the number of non-railroad employer's liability cases before state supreme 
courts jumped from 154 in 1900 to 490 in 1911.54 This legal uncertainty, 
along with the concomitant increase in litigation, was one of the major 
reasons employers supported the move to a no-fault workers’ 
compensation system.55 The other major reason was that employers 
believed they could easily pass on this more predictable cost to their 
employees in the form of lower wages.56 
 
2.  Labor 
 
Organized labor initially favored reforms to the negligence liability 
system over its wholesale replacement by a no-fault workers’ 
compensation system, and it was instrumental in achieving the legislative 
reforms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that limited 
                                                 
49 Id. at 318. 
50 Id. at 318 (citing Narromore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 96 F. 298, 
304-05 (6th Cir. 1899)). 
51 Id. at 318. 
52 FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 98. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 95, 98. 
55 Id. at 93-101. 
56 Id. at 90. 
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employers' common law defenses.57 Organized labor's initial opposition to 
workers’ compensation was part of a more general distrust of government 
regulation of the workplace, which unions feared would be unduly 
influenced by business interests.58 As the labor-backed legislative reforms 
to the negligence liability system came on line, however, labor’s position 
on workers’ compensation began to shift.59 In spite of these reforms, large 
numbers of workers were still left uncompensated.60 Although certain 
employer defenses had been curtailed by the reforms, employees were still 
required to show negligence in order to prevail.61 From a practical per-
spective, evidence of such negligence would likely often be in the hands 
of the employer or could only be obtained with the cooperation of fellow 
employees who were beholden to the employer for their livelihoods. As a 
result, in 1909, the American Federation of Laborers, through its federal 
and state branches, became a vocal proponent of workers’ compensation 
statutes.62 
 
3. The Insurance Industry 
 
The insurance industry was a strong supporter of workers’ 
compensation legislation, at least in states where no state monopoly was 
proposed.63 From the industry’s standpoint, such legislation would in-
crease its customer base from those few workers that purchased personal 
accident policies to every employee of every employer covered by the 
statute.64 Additionally, the workers’ compensation system drastically 
reduced adverse selection problems because in most cases, individual 
employees would not be making the decision as to whether or not they 
should get coverage.65 In a mandatory system, every employee in a job 
                                                 
57 Id. at 101. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.; see also Green v. W. Am. Co., 70 P. 310, 320 (1902) (describing alleged 
negligence causes of action in a worker personal injury case). 
62 FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 101. 
63 Id. at 109-12. In states with a monopolistic state fund, the state fund acts as the 
sole workers’ compensation insurance carrier for the state. Private workers' compensation 
insurance is not allowed in such states. E.g., LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 78. Thus, it is 
understandable why the insurance industry would be opposed to legislation mandating a 
monopolistic state fund. 
64 FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 112.  
65 Id. Adverse selection is a term of art in the risk management and insurance 
industry. It refers to a situation in which individuals with low levels of risk opt out of the 
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covered by the statute would be required to be covered, and thus the prob-
lem of only the riskiest employees entering the insurance market would be 
completely obviated.  
 
D. Compulsory Workers’  Compensation 
 
Given that the interests of employers, labor, and the insurance industry 
became aligned in the early 1900s, workers’ compensation statutes were 
quickly adopted in most states.66 In stark contrast to modern statutes, of 
which nearly all are compulsory and cover all industries,67 the majority of 
early state statutes was either elective, only applicable to certain hazardous 
industries, or had both of these features.68 The key to understanding why 
the early statutes were not compulsory is to understand the constitutional 
challenges to and justifications for the early statutes.  
Moving from the negligence liability system to a no-fault workers’ 
compensation system was a shift that substantially affected the rights and 
responsibilities of both employers and employees. This move was 
challenged on several constitutional grounds, the most important of which 
were the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.69 Employers subject to compulsory compensation statutes argued 
that forcing an employer to pay benefits to injured employees in cases 
where the employer was not at fault was tantamount to depriving the 
employer of its property without due process of the law.70 Employers 
could be forced to pay benefits without any proof of wrongdoing or 
                                                                                                                         
insurance market. With fewer “good risks” in the market, the average cost of risk for 
those that remain in the market increases. This is because the cost of the “bad risks” will 
be distributed across fewer premium payers. As this cost increases, more good risks may 
drop out fueling a cycle of increased costs and average losses. Mandatory participation 
obviates this danger by not allowing “good risks,” or anyone else, to opt out. 
66 Id. at 113.  
67 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2009 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
LAWS 10-13 (2009) [hereinafter CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS]. 
68 FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8, at 103-04 tbl.4.3; LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 
11-13. 
69 LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 12. 
70 See e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (holding the New 
York Workmen’s Compensation Act does not violate the Due Process Clause); Hawkins 
v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (holding the Iowa elective Workmen’s Compensation 
Act did not violate the Due Process Clause); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 
U.S. 219 (1917) (holding the Washington Workmen’s Compensation Act does not violate 
the Due Process Clause). 
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negligence.71 Furthermore, to the extent that statutes defined which 
employers were covered and which were not, covered employers raised 
equal protection challenges claiming that they were deprived of the 
common law defenses available to similarly situated employers that were 
not covered under the statutes.72 Another constitutional challenge to 
workers’ compensation statutes was that they interfered with the right of 
employers and employees to contract.73  
State legislatures implemented two common measures, sometimes in 
combination, to protect their workers’ compensation statutes from these 
constitutional challenges.74 The first was to make their statutes elective, 
and the second was to restrict their scope to only certain hazardous 
industries.75 Combinations of these two measures, such as a system that 
was compulsory as to certain hazardous industries but elective as to all 
others, were also enacted.76 If a compensation system is elective, it cannot 
deprive an employer of its property without the employer electing to be 
bound by the system.77 Elective systems are also non-disruptive of the 
right to contract, especially where both the employer and employee are 
permitted to elect whether or not to participate. The rationale for the 
limitation of the scope of compensation statutes to hazardous industries is 
different and proceeded as follows. Because states retain the power to 
regulate matters of public health, safety, and welfare as part of the police 
power, to the extent that compensation statutes applied only to hazardous 
industries, they could be viewed as public safety and welfare regulation, 
which is within the power reserved to the states.78 
The United States Supreme Court confirmed that either of these 
approaches was sufficient to overcome constitutional objections. In 1917, 
                                                 
71 Hawkins, 243 U.S. at 210; N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. at 188; Mountain Timber 
Co., 243 U.S. at 219. 
72 See Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 571 (1915) (stating that employers 
do not waive common law defenses if they fail to comply with state workers’ 
compensation statutes); see also FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 8 at 103-04 tbl.4.3; 
LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 11-13.  
73 See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. at 206 (explaining that freedom of contract is 
included in the right to liberty and the right to private property). Both of these rights are 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution against 
deprivation by the federal or state governments respectively, without due process of law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV.  
74 E.g., LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 13. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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the Supreme Court considered New York and Washington state 
compensation statutes, which were compulsory as to certain hazardous 
industries, as well as the Iowa compensation statute, which was elective.79  
The Court issued separate opinions upholding each of these statutes on the 
same day.80 In upholding the New York statute, the Court held, “[i]t 
cannot be pronounced arbitrary and unreasonable for the State to impose 
upon the employer the absolute duty of making a moderate and definite 
compensation in money to every injured employee ….”81 Speaking 
directly to the police power justification, the Court further stated, “[t]he 
subject matter in respect of which freedom of contract is restricted is the 
matter of compensation for human life or limb lost or disability incurred in 
the course of hazardous employment, and the public has a direct interest in 
this as affecting the common welfare.”82 
For states that were inclined to extend compulsory coverage to the 
greatest number of workers possible, the question remained as to how far a 
state legislature could go in its definition of hazardous employments. The 
Supreme Court addressed this question in 1922 in the case of Ward & 
Gow v. Krinsky.83 In Ward, the Court considered a provision in the New 
York compensation statute that classified any business employing more 
than four “workmen or operatives” as hazardous.84 Workmen and 
operatives were terms of art that essentially meant manual laborers or 
machine operators.85 The provision under consideration provided that a 
business with four or more manual laborers was compelled to provide 
workers’ compensation insurance for all of its employees, not just those 
doing the hazardous work.86 The Court, employing somewhat strained 
logic,87 upheld the statute, holding that “[t]he Legislature, in the New 
York system, is justified in extending the benefits of the Compensation 
                                                 
79 Id. 
80 See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 188 (1917) (upholding the New 
York Workmen’s Compensation statute); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 210 (1917) 
(upholding the Iowa elective Workmen’s Compensation statute); Mountain Timber Co. v. 
Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 219 (1917) (upholding the Washington Workmen’s 
Compensation statute).  
81 N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. at 205. 
82 Id. at 206. 
83 Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922). 
84 Id. at 506-07. 
85 Id. at 527 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
86 Id. at 506-07. 
87 Id. at 513 (reasoning “[t]hat there was inherent hazard in Krinsky’s occupation is 
conclusively shown by the fact that in the course of it he received a serious and disabling 
personal injury arising out of it”).  
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Law as far as it reasonably may determine occupational hazard to 
extend—to the ‘vanishing point’ as it were ….”88 Thus, the Court left the 
states with broad discretion to determine where hazard existed. States 
could extend their compensation systems to cover any employment that 
had even remote chances of causing injury rather than discarding hazard 
as a requirement for a valid exercise of the police power.89  
In a case the following year, the Supreme Court considered “a 
compulsory compensation act establishing in all except certain 
employments, an exclusive system governing compensation for injuries to 
employees resulting in disability or death.”90 The issue before the Court in 
Madera was not the facial constitutionality of the statute, but whether the 
statute was constitutional, as applied, in requiring payment of death 
benefits to foreign national beneficiaries living in a foreign country.91 
Nevertheless, the Court began its analysis by affirming the facial 
constitutionality of the California statute, noting, “[t]his Court has in 
several cases sustained the constitutionality of workmen’s compensation 
acts, from which the California Act in its constitutional aspects is not 
distinguishable.”92  
Madera illustrates how Ward essentially eliminated the hazard 
requirement. The Court in Ward granted state legislatures the power to 
define occupational hazard even to the “vanishing point.”93 California 
defined hazard in such a way that its compulsory compensation system 
extended to “all except certain employments.”94 Without pausing to 
analyze whether hazard existed in “all but certain employments,” the 
Court summarily stated that California’s Act was not distinguishable in 
any constitutional aspect from any of the compensation statutes it had 
previously upheld and that it was a valid exercise of the state's police 
power.95 Thus, post Ward, states were unburdened by the hazard 
requirement and were free to extend their compulsory compensation 
systems to cover all, or at least nearly all, employees.  
                                                 
88 Id. at 520. 
89 Id. at 520-21. 
90 Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 262 U.S. 499, 499 (1923) 
(emphasis added). 
91 Id. at 500-01. 
92 Id. at 501 (citing Ward, 259 U.S. 503). 
93 Ward, 259 U.S at 520. 
94 Id. at 499. 
95 Madera, 262 U.S. at 501. 
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Over the years, nearly every state amended its workers’ compensation 
statutes to make coverage compulsory.96 Today, workers’ compensation is 
compulsory in all but one state—Texas.97 Some states have exceptions to 
the general rule for narrow groups of specific employees like casual 
employees, domestic employees, and farm laborers, while others exempt 
employers with fewer than five employees.98 But aside from these 
exceptions, workers’ compensation is compulsory even in these states for 
the vast majority of employers and employees.99  
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, in its 2009 Analysis of Workers’ 
Compensation Laws, states that only three states presently have an elective 
workers’ compensation system: New Jersey, South Dakota, and Texas.100 
While New Jersey's statute is technically elective, it requires that opt-out 
employers carry liability insurance to cover their common law liability 
arising out of workplace injuries.101 As such, insurance has never been 
available in New Jersey; the practical result is that opting out is not an 
option in that state.102  
The classification of South Dakota as an elective state in table 1 of the 
2009 Analysis may have been a clerical error.103 South Dakota's statute is 
technically elective, but any employer that opts out is liable to action by 
injured employees who are permitted to proceed as if the employer had 
opted in. Injured employees still do not have to prove negligence even if 
                                                 
96 LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 13. 
97 Id.; see also TEX. DEP’T OF INS. WORKERS’ COMP. RESEARCH & EVALUATION 
GRP., COMPARISON OF STATE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 5 tbl.1 (2008), 
available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/wc/regulation/documents/wc0904compare.zip 
[hereinafter COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS] (citing U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2003 
ANALYSIS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS (2003)) (comparing state workers’ 
compensation systems); TEX. DEP’T OF INS. WORKERS’ COMP. RESEARCH & EVALUATION 
GRP., EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION IN THE TEXAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM: 
2008 ESTIMATES 2 (2008), available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/wcreg/docu-
ments/2008_Employer_Partic.ppt [hereinafter EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008] 
(discussing employer participation in the Texas worker’s compensation system); 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS, supra note 67 (listing the characteristics of states’ 
workers’ compensation systems).   
98 LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 13; CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS, supra note 67. 
99 LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 13; COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS, supra note 97 at 5 tbl.1; 
EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 2; CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
ANALYSIS, supra note 67.  
100 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS, supra note 67. 
101 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-72 (West 2010); LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 111. 
102 LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 111. 
103 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 22. Table II of the same 
report states that workers' compensation in South Dakota is “[c]ompulsory as to all 
employment. Elective as to employer performing labor incidental to job.” Id. 
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the employer opted out.104 Moreover, the measure of damages in such a 
suit is 100 percent of the medical expense payments that would have been 
due under the workers’ compensation statute plus two times the amount 
recoverable under other provisions of the statute, such as lost wages.105  
In New Jersey and South Dakota, damages recoverable are greater if 
an employer “opts out” with no corresponding reduction in the employee's 
ability to obtain damages.106 Thus, the only state that allows nearly all of 
its employers to elect whether to participate in the workers’ compensation 
system is Texas.107 
 
II. WORKERS’  COMPENSATION IN TEXAS 
 
A. Overview 
 
Texas’s workers’ compensation system has been elective since it was 
first adopted in 1913.108 Employers in the state can choose whether or not 
to subscribe to the workers’ compensation system.109 To opt out of the 
workers’ compensation system, an employer need only notify the 
Workers’ Compensation Division of the Texas Department of Insurance of 
its election to opt out110 and notify its employees of this election upon 
hiring and via notices posted in conspicuous locations in the workplace.111  
In 2008, 33 percent of Texas employers opted out of the workers’ 
compensation system.112 These employers employed 25 percent of the 
state’s employees.113 Twenty-six percent of the largest employers in 
Texas, those with more than 500 employees, opted out in 2008, and the 
smallest employers, those with four or fewer employees, opted out at a 
                                                 
104 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-3-11 (2009). 
105 Id.  
106 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-72 (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-3-11. 
107 LENCSIS, supra note 15, at 13; COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS, supra note 97; 
EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 2; CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
ANALYSIS, supra note 67. 
108 EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 2, 4 (relying heavily on the 
data contained in this report). The report is based on a survey of 2,585 employers 
conducted by the Texas Department of Insurance and the Public Policy Research Institute 
at Texas A&M University. Id. The authors of the report estimate that their statistical 
findings have a 2.4 percent margin of error at the 95 percent confidence level. Id.  
109 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 2009).  
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 6. 
113 Id. at 7. 
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rate of 40 percent.114 The top reasons reported for opting out of the 
workers’ compensation system in 2008 were: (1) workers’ compensation 
premiums were too high (26 percent); (2) the employer had too few 
employees (26 percent); (3) the employer was not required to carry 
workers’ compensation (11 percent); (4) the employer had few on-the-job 
injuries (9 percent); and (5) medical costs in the workers’ compensation 
system were too high.115 The top reasons reported by non-subscribing 
employers with greater than 500 employees were: (1) workers’ 
compensation premiums were too high; (2) medical costs in the workers’ 
compensation system were too high; and because (3) they had too few 
injuries.116 
For subscribing employers, the workers’ compensation system works 
much the same in Texas as it does in other states. The system for non-
subscribers, the term of art used in Texas for employers that have opted 
out of the workers’ compensation system, is quite different and warrants 
some explanation. Non-subscribing employers are subject essentially to 
the negligence liability system described supra in part I.A, with some 
modifications.117 For an injured employee to recover damages from a non-
subscribing employer, he must show that the employer was negligent.118 In 
such a negligence case, the employer is barred by statute from raising the 
common law defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and 
negligence of a fellow employee.119 Thus, once the employee has proven 
negligence, he is entitled to recover regardless of his own contributory 
negligence, the negligence of a fellow employee, or his assumption of the 
risk.120 
Each individual employee in Texas is also permitted to opt out of the 
workers’ compensation system if he works for an employer that has opted 
in.121 To do so, an employee must provide his employer with written 
notice of his election within five days of either the day he began work or 
the day he received written notice that the employer participated in the 
workers’ compensation system.122 Unlike situations where the employer 
                                                 
114 Id. at 8. 
115 Id. at 13. 
116 Id. at 14.  
117 See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (West 2009) (listing the defenses that are 
unavailable to employers). 
118 See id. (listing the defenses that are unavailable to employers); see also LENCSIS, 
supra note 15, at 111. 
119 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(a). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. § 406.034(a). 
122 Id. § 406.034(b). 
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has opted out, the employer retains the defenses of assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, and negligence of a fellow employee when the 
employee opts out and later brings suit.123 
 
B. Alternative Benefit Plans  
 
Although they have no obligation to do so, many non-subscribing 
employers provide benefits to their injured employees as part of their risk 
management and employee benefit programs.124 These employers fund 
occupational injury benefits through various mechanisms, including self-
funding and multiple forms of insurance, such as excess indemnity 
insurance, standard occupational accident insurance, and group health 
insurance.125 In 2008, 52 percent of non-subscribing employers, covering 
82 percent of employees of non-subscribers, provided occupational injury 
benefits.126 Fifty-one percent of non-subscribing small employers, 89 
percent of non-subscribing mid-size employers, and 83 percent of non-
subscribing large employers provided some form of occupational injury 
benefits.127 The stratified percentages of the non-subscriber workforce 
covered by occupational injury benefits were as follows: 62 percent of 
employees of small non-subscribers, 90 percent of medium sized non-
subscribers, and 86 percent of large non-subscribers.128  
Employers providing occupational injury benefits have no duty to 
provide a level of benefits equivalent to that provided by workers’ 
compensation.129 Of the 52 percent of non-subscribing employers that paid 
occupational injury benefits in 2008,130 only 70 percent covered medical 
costs.131 Of those that covered medical costs, 63 percent covered expenses 
for as long as they were medically necessary, while the remaining 37 
percent capped medical expenses either with a dollar limit, a time limit, or 
both.132 Applying these percentages to the larger universe of non-
                                                 
123 Id. § 406.034(d). 
124 Hardberger, supra note 34, at 7; EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, 
at 22-28. 
125 EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 26. 
126 Id. at 23. 
127 Id. at 24. 
128 Id. at 24. 
129 Hardberger, supra note 34, at 7; EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, 
at 22-28. Employers are not required to pay any benefits absent a showing of negligence. 
Id.  
130 EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 23. 
131 Id. at 27. 
132 Id. 
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subscribers, the total percentage of non-subscribers that provided a 
medical expense benefit to injured employees in 2008 was approximately 
36 percent, with approximately 23 percent of non-subscribers providing 
benefits for as long as medically necessary and 13 percent providing 
benefits up to a time or dollar limit.133 The numbers are similar for wage 
replacement benefits. Approximately 35 percent of all non-subscribers 
paid occupational injury benefits and 68 percent of those non-subscribers 
paid wage replacement benefits in 2008.134 Of these, 57 percent paid wage 
replacement benefits for the entire duration of the employee's lost time; 
the remaining 43 percent paid wage replacement benefits subject to a 
durational or dollar limit.135 Again, applying these percentages to the 
larger universe of non-subscribers, only about 20 percent of non-sub-
scribers provided wage replacement benefits for the entire duration of their 
employees’ lost time. 
 
C. Waiver & Arbitration Provisions 
 
Texas has worked hard to maintain a balance between maintaining a 
viable alternative to traditional workers’ compensation on the one hand 
and protecting employees from employer overreaching on the other. For 
example, prior to 2001, non-subscribing employers could condition an 
employee's future receipt of occupational injury benefits on the employee 
waiving his rights to any common law negligence claims prior to suffering 
any injury, such as at the time of hire.136 The benefit to the employer was 
that it could more easily calculate its exposure to occupational injury ben-
efits claims and negligence claims because it would know ex ante which 
remedy was available to each employee.137 Many, however, believed this 
was unfair because the employee was being asked to waive the rights 
normally waived under a full-fledged workers’ compensation system in 
exchange for what was often an inferior package of benefits.138 Moreover, 
the employee was being asked to do so before suffering an injury, when it 
was most unlikely that he would have the assistance of a lawyer to help 
him evaluate the bargain. The Texas Legislature responded to this concern 
                                                 
133 See id. (detailing payments of medical benefits by non-subscriber employers). 
134 Id. at 28. 
135 Id. 
136 See, e.g., Lawrence v. CDB Servs., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 544, 554 (Tex. 2001) (holding 
that the Texas statute did not clearly prohibit pre-injury waivers, and as such, the court 
lacked authority to read such a prohibition into the statute). 
137 Hardberger, supra note 34, at 10. 
138 Id. at 19. 
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in 2001 by amending the labor code to proscribe such pre-injury 
waivers.139   
Another abuse of the waiver for alternative benefits bargain was the 
use of post-injury waivers that followed too closely in time to the injury. 
The concern was that employers could exact a waiver from the employee 
at the moment the employee was most vulnerable—right after an injury 
and while awaiting care.140 In other words, an employer could show up at 
the hospital while the employee was awaiting treatment for his injury with 
an offer to pay for treatment in exchange for the employee’s waiver of his 
right to any legal action against the employer. The Texas Legislature acted 
in 2005 to prohibit this practice by amending the labor code to prohibit 
certain post-injury waivers.141 Post-injury waivers are now permitted only 
so long as they meet certain requirements.142 These requirements are that: 
(1) the employee enters the waiver with knowledge of the waiver’s effect; 
(2) the waiver is entered into not earlier than the tenth business day after 
the initial report of injury; (3) before signing the waiver, the employee has 
been evaluated by a non-emergency physician; and (4) the waiver is in a 
writing under which the true intent of the parties is specifically stated.143 
With pre-injury waivers abolished and post-injury waivers more strictly 
regulated, a new frontier has opened up in the continuing struggle to 
maintain the balance between preserving a viable alternative to workers’ 
compensation and assuring fairness to employees.  
A second tool non-subscribing employers use to protect against law-
suits in cases where they have provided or will provide occupational in-
jury benefits is requiring the employee to sign an arbitration agreement.144 
In 2008, 14 percent of non-subscribers asked their employees to sign an 
agreement to resolve disputes through arbitration.145 Of these, 95 percent 
                                                 
139 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(e) (West 2009). 
140 See, e.g., Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Sambrano, No. 01-07-00003, 2008 Tex. 
App. LEXIS 4844, at *8 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. June 26, 2008) (involving the 
employer’s delivery of a post-injury waiver to the employee, while the employee awaited 
treatment, stating “in electing to accept benefits under the PLAN, I understand and agree 
to give up the right to file a legal action against the Company … for any and all damages 
sustained by me because of my injury”). 
141 Id. at *9 n.6.  
142 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(f). 
143 Id.  
144 See Hardberger, supra note 34, at 12-15 (discussing the use of arbitration 
provisions to limit employee causes of action); EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra 
note 97, at 29-31 (quantifying the use of arbitration). 
145 EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 30. 
344         WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW     [Vol. 2:323 
 
asked their employees to sign the arbitration agreement pre-injury.146 
Among non-subscribing employers that utilized arbitration agreements, 36 
percent stated they would not provide an employee medical or wage re-
placement benefits if the employee did not agree to arbitration.147 One 
subtle way that arbitration agreements affect employee’s rights is by the 
employer’s selection of the arbiter. In 2008, 74 percent of non-subscribing 
employers that utilized arbitration reported knowing who served as the 
arbiter in arbitration proceedings.148 Of these, more than half reported that 
the arbiter was either a single person who works for the employer and 
always serves as the employer's arbiter or a single person who works for 
the employer but is mutually agreed upon by the employer and the 
employee.149  
In addition to this threat of bias, utilization of arbitration agreements 
affects employees’ rights in a number of much more direct and serious 
ways. First, several courts of appeals in Texas have found that when a pre-
injury waiver of common law claims is included in an arbitration 
agreement, the statutory prohibition against pre-injury waivers is 
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),150 at least in cases 
involving an employer that in any way participates in interstate 
commerce.151 Therefore, an employer, who would otherwise be prohibited 
by statute from requiring an employee to sign a pre-injury waiver of his 
right to sue the employer in exchange for participation in the employer’s 
                                                 
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 31. 
149 Id. 
150 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2009).  
151 See Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Sambrano, No. 01-07-00003, 2008 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 4844, at *34 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. June 26, 2008) (“[W]e … now hold 
that the FAA preempts any potential application of the Texas non-waiver provision stated 
in Labor Code section 406.033(e) to prevent enforcement of the arbitration clause stated 
in [the] Labor Code.”); In re Border Steel, Inc., 229 S.W.3d 825, 832 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2007) (“[T]he FAA preempts the application of the Texas non-waiver provision to 
prevent the enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement at issue here.”); In re R & R Pers. 
Specialists of Tyler, Inc., 146 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (“We conclude that 
the FAA preempts the application of the nonwaiver provision to prevent or restrict 
enforcement of the arbitration provisions at issue here.”). These holdings are consistent 
with the holdings of other courts on the preemption by the FAA of various non-waiver 
provisions. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the 
FAA preempted a non-waiver provision in California’s franchise statute); Jack B. Anglin 
Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992) (holding that the FAA preempted a non-waiver 
provision in the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act); Commerce 
Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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occupational injury benefits program, can now do so indirectly by simply 
including the pre-injury waiver as part of an arbitration agreement.152  
Still more troubling for employees is the practice of conditioning 
employment on acceptance of the waiver and arbitration agreement. This 
is possible because the FAA applies to employment contracts in general, 
with a small exception for employment contracts for transportation 
workers.153 As the court in Swift pointed out, agreements regarding the 
relationship between employers and at-will employees are considered 
employment contracts in Texas for this and other purposes.154 Thus, the 
court in Bison, for example, held that an employee was bound by an 
arbitration agreement as a matter of law by virtue of the employee 
continuing to work for the employer after having received notice of the 
agreement.155 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied in part on In re 
Halliburton, an earlier decision by the Texas Supreme Court.156 
Conditioning employment on the acceptance of an arbitration and waiver 
agreement essentially immunizes an employer from a negligence lawsuit 
by its employees without subjecting it to the requirements of the workers’ 
compensation system.157 An employer can provide benefits that are 
inferior to those required under workers’ compensation and still receive 
the principle benefit of the workers’ compensation system by requiring 
employees to agree to waive their common law claims as part of an 
arbitration agreement.  
It is unclear at this point whether and how the Texas Legislature can 
respond to this new threat to the careful balance it has struggled to 
maintain. Because the case law on FAA preemption of non-waiver 
provisions appears to be so well settled at the federal level,158 federal 
                                                 
152 See supra text accompanying note 151.  
153 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001); 
see also In re Swift Transp. Co., 311 S.W.3d 484, 488 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding that an 
arbitration agreement in a non-subscriber’s occupational injury benefit plan was part of 
an employment contract since employees could not opt-out of participation and that since 
the employee in issue was involved in transportation, the arbitration agreement was not 
enforceable under the FAA).  
154 See Swift Transp., 311 S.W.3d at 489 (citing Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 
S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. 1989)).  
155 Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Sambrano, No. 01-07-00003, 2008 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 4844, at *18 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. June 26, 2008).   
156 In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 572-73 (2002) (holding that an at-will 
employee accepted an arbitration agreement after notice was provided and the employee 
continued working for the employer after the effective date of the agreement).  
157 See id. 
158 See supra text accompanying note 151.  
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legislative action may be required, such as amending the FAA to apply to 
employment contracts only to the extent that it does not interfere with the 
operation of non-waiver provisions in the labor and employment codes of 
the states. As there is no indication that such federal action is pending, 
FAA preemption remains a serious and potentially existential threat to 
Texas's non-mandatory workers’ compensation system.  
 
D. Retaliatory Discharge 
 
Texas provides a statutory bar to employers discharging or in any 
other way discriminating against an employee because the employee has 
filed a workers’ compensation claim.159 In 1998, the Texas Supreme Court 
addressed the question of whether this non-discrimination provision in an 
earlier version of the statute applied to non-subscribing employers.160 The 
court in Bouchet held that it did not.161 This means that non-subscribing 
employers are not barred from taking adverse employment actions against 
their injured employees.162 As a matter of public policy, this loophole 
should be closed. A right to a benefit is meaningless in the employment 
context if the employer can simply deter employees from exercising it 
through retaliation against those employees that do.  
 
III. WORKERS’  COMPENSATION RISK FINANCING 
 
A. Overview 
 
The top reason reported by non-subscribing employers in Texas for 
opting out of the workers’ compensation system was that workers’ 
compensation insurance premiums were too high.163 In order to evaluate 
this justification, it is important to understand the various risk financing 
mechanisms utilized by employers under a workers’  compensation system 
and to understand how these differ from opting out of the workers’  
compensation system altogether.  
 
 
                                                 
159 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001 (West 2009). 
160 See Tex. Mexican Ry. v. Bouchet, 963 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Tex. 1998). 
161 Id. 
162 See id. at 56 (holding that an employee’s action for retaliation cannot stand if not 
covered by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act). 
163 EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 13-14.  
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B. Guaranteed Cost Plans 
 
Guaranteed cost workers’ compensation insurance is the most basic 
form of risk financing.164 The employer pays a premium to an insurance 
company, and the insurance company pays the employer’s workers’ 
compensation claims.165 The insurance company bears the entire risk of 
paying the claims and thus the risk of inability to pay claims is minimal.166 
Most small to mid-size employers purchase guaranteed cost workers’ 
com-pensation insurance.167 Guaranteed cost workers’ compensation 
premiums are calculated based on a number of factors. First, the insurer 
determines how to classify the predominant type of work done by the 
employer, what is known as the employer’s governing classification.168 
Each insurance company that writes workers’ compensation in a state files 
its rates with the state for each of these classifications, or class codes as 
they are known in the industry.169 This filed rate is then multiplied by the 
employer’s payroll to determine the premium.170  
In addition to the filed rate and the payroll, insurers may add factors to 
adjust for the loss experience of the employer.171 One such factor is called 
an experience modification factor, or “experience mod.”172 The experience 
mod for an employer is a comparison between the employer’s historical 
loss experience and the historical loss experience of all employers in the 
same class code.173 An experience mod of greater than one will result in an 
                                                 
164 The author of this Note spent six years working as a licensed commercial 
insurance broker for one of the two largest brokers in the world. Much of this section 
reflects general commercial insurance knowledge the author acquired working in the 
insurance industry. For additional information on risk financing, see generally RICHARD 
BERTHELSEN, ET AL., RISK FINANCING (4th ed. 2006), which provides a detailed treatment 
of risk financing. 
165 BERTHELSEN, ET AL., supra note 164, at 2.3. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 See e.g., Workers’ Compensation Risk Classification, WASHINGTON STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, http://www.lni.wa.gov/ClaimsIns/Insurance 
/RatesRisk / How/RatesFaq/Default.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (Risk Classification). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 See generally BERTHELSEN, ET AL., supra note 164, at 6.5.  
172 Id. (an experience mod may fall under the category of experience rating). 
173 Id. (explaining that an experience rating refers to a plan that “adjusts the premium 
for the current policy period to recognize the loss experience of the insured organization 
during past policy periods”). For detailed information on how to calculate an experience 
modification factor, see Calculating a Firm’s Experience Modification Factor, 
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, http://www.lni.wa.gov/ 
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increased premium, and an experience mod of less than one will result in a 
reduced premium.174 Insurance carriers may also apply other more 
discretionary credits to achieve a premium level that is acceptable to the 
client and profitable to the carrier.175  
While experience mods and discretionary credits can substantially 
affect workers’ compensation premiums, the carriers’ filed rates, which 
form the basis of guaranteed cost premiums, are not discretionary.176 
These are subject to year over year fluctuation based not only on the 
combined loss experience in each class code, but also on conditions in the 
broader insurance market like the cost and availability of reinsurance, 
insured losses across all lines, and investment returns.177 For these 
reasons, employers insured under guaranteed cost programs are the ones 
most susceptible to fluctuations in the insurance market and to paying 
premiums that are the most out of proportion to their losses.178 In order to 
avoid this result, larger employers that have reached a critical mass and 
predictability of expected losses tend to favor loss sensitive plans.179 
 
C. Loss Sensitive Plans 
 
“Loss sensitive plans” is a term of art that describes any type of 
insurance plan in which the insured will pay more if losses are greater than 
expected and pay less if losses are less than expected.180 There are a 
number of types of loss sensitive plans, including retrospective rating 
plans,181 group captives,182 self-insurance,183 and large deductible plans.184 
This Note will provide a brief description of the latter two, as they are the 
simplest to understand and also the most common.  
                                                                                                                         
ClaimsIns/Insurance/RatesRisk/How/ExpFactor/ExpModFactor/Default.asp (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2011) (Washington State Department of Labor). 
174 See Workers’ Compensation Risk Classification, supra note 168. 
175 See e.g., BERTHELSEN, ET AL., supra note 164, at 3.27, 3.30 (explaining that 
insurers may choose to give the insured a lower premium if they accept a higher 
deductible and vice versa, and stating that larger deductible plans are more common with 
workers’ compensation insurance). 
176 Id. at 2.31-2.32. 
177 See generally id. at 2.31-2.32 (referring to these fluctuations as the “underwriting 
cycle”). For a detailed explanation of reinsurance, see id. at 7.3-7.4. 
178 See generally id. at 2.31-2.32 (addressing fluctuations in premiums). 
179 See generally id. at 1.11-1.12. 
180 Id. at 13.11. 
181 See generally id. at ch. 6 (discussing retrospective rating plans). 
182 See generally id. at ch. 8 (discussing captive insurance plans). 
183 See generally id. at ch. 5 (discussing self-insurance plans). 
184 See generally id. at ch. 3 (discussing large deductible plans). 
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Self-insurance is permitted in nearly every state, including Texas.185 A 
typical self-insurance program works as follows. First, an employer must 
qualify as a self-insurer with the state’s insurance department.186 Qual-
ification typically involves an analysis of the employer’s loss history and 
its financial statements over a certain period of time to ensure that the 
employer will have the financial wherewithal to pay its claims.187 Other 
requirements often include the payment of a surcharge and the posting of a 
bond with the state to guaranty payment of claims.188  
Once an employer has qualified, it will typically analyze its loss 
forecasts.189 A loss forecast is an actuarial tool that calculates an 
employer’s expected losses in each year at various loss limits.190 A loss 
limit is simply a cap on the value of each loss.191 Through the loss forecast 
analysis, an employer may, for example, determine that it expects to have 
$7,500,000 in total workers’ compensation claims with $7,000,000 a year 
in losses under $500,000; $6,000,000 in losses under $250,000, and 
$5,000,000 in losses under $100,000. With this data, the employer can 
seek excess workers’ compensation insurance quotes with different self-
insured retentions (SIRs).192 Assuming that the actual losses exactly 
matched the predictions in the loss forecast, if the employer chose an SIR 
of $100,000, it would pay $5,000,000 in workers’ compensation claims 
out of pocket, and its insurance company would pay the remaining 
$2,500,000. Similarly, if the employer chose a $500,000 SIR, it would pay 
$7,000,000 in workers’ compensation claims, and its insurance company 
would pay the remaining $500,000.  
In a world of perfect information, an employer would be best served 
by selecting the $500,000 SIR. This is because the insurance company will 
charge any amount of loss forecast over the loss limit in premium. Thus, if 
the employer elected the $100,000 SIR, the insurance company would 
start its premium calculations at $2,500,000, the amount of losses 
expected over the SIR. To this number would be applied expense, profit, 
                                                 
185 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 10-13. 
186 See generally BERTHELSEN, ET AL., supra note 164, at ch. 5 (discussing self-
insurance plans). 
187 See id. (discussing self-insurance plans). 
188 See generally id. (discussing self-insurance plans). 
189 See generally id. at 4.34, 4.37 (describing the use of information provided by loss 
forecasts). 
190 See generally id. at 4.34 (describing the use of information provided by loss 
forecasts). 
191 See generally id. at 4.34, 4.37 (describing the use of information provided by loss 
forecasts). 
192 See generally id.  
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and risk factors. In contrast, at a $500,000 SIR, the insurance company 
would start at $500,000, and apply its expense, profit, and risk factors to 
this lower amount. Assuming that expenses beyond the expected losses 
ran at 15 percent,193 and assuming the losses came in as expected, the 
expenses paid at the $100,000 SIR would be $375,000 while they would 
be only $75,000 at the $500,000 SIR. The total cost of risk to the 
employer, again based on the assumptions already laid out, would be the 
sum of the losses the employer retained, plus the premiums charged by the 
insurance company. At the $100,000 SIR, the total cost would be 
$5,000,000 in retained losses, plus a premium of $2,500,000 representing 
the insurer’s expected losses, plus $375,000 representing the insurer’s 
expense and profits, for a total of $7,875,000. At the $500,000 SIR, the 
total would be $7,000,000 in retained losses, plus $500,000 representing 
the insurer’s expected losses, plus $75,000 representing the insurer's profit 
and expenses, for a total of $7,575,000. Of course, there is no such thing 
as perfect information, and many employers will trade the increased 
expense for a lower amount of risk. To understand how this works, assume 
there are two additional losses beyond what was predicted in the loss 
forecast. Assume both of these losses cost $500,000 each. The additional 
cost to the employer with the $100,000 SIR would be $200,000, two 
losses capped at $100,000 each. The additional cost of these losses to the 
employer with the $500,000 SIR, on the other hand, would be $1,000,000. 
In a year with these two “extra” losses, the employer with the $100,000 
SIR would have a total cost of risk of $8,075,000 whereas the employer 
with the $500,000 SIR would have a total cost of risk of $8,575,000. 
Notice in each of these hypotheticals that far and away the largest 
component in the total cost of risk is the actual losses.  
A similar concept to self-insurance is the large deductible program.194 
The fundamental difference between a large deductible program and self-
insurance is the party ultimately liable to the injured worker.195 In self-
                                                 
193 This figure is for illustrative purposes only. According to a survey of its clients, 
Marsh, Inc., one of the world’s two largest commercial insurance brokers, puts the 
percentage of workers’ compensation costs attributable directly to claims and related 
handling expenses at 91 percent for clients with loss sensitive plans. MARSH, INC., 
CASUALTY COST OF RISK 2008 2 (2009), available at http://global.marsh.com/ 
documents/CasualtyCostofRisk_Report2008.pdf. The purpose of this section is not to 
estimate the exact expense ratio an employer can expect, but rather to demonstrate that 
even at a conservative 15 percent, the bulk of an employer’s workers’ compensation costs 
is directly attributable to its losses.  
194 See BERTHELSEN, ET AL., supra note 164, at 3.3 (discussing large deductible 
plans). 
195 See id. (discussing uses of large deductible plans). 
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insurance, the employer is directly liable to the employee, and the 
insurer’s liability does not attach until the employer has paid the entire 
amount of the self-insured retention.196 In a large deductible program, on 
the other hand, the insurer is directly liable to the injured employee and 
must recover deductible payments from the employer.197 Thus, the risk 
that the employer will not pay rests with the employee in a self-insured 
plan and with the insurance company in a deductible plan. Accordingly, 
states, on behalf of employees, protect against this risk by analyzing 
employers’ financial ability to pay claims and by taking other steps like 
requiring security and collecting surcharges to fund unpaid claims.198 
Insurance companies perform the same functions when they write large 
deductible plans.199 
 
IV. HOW EMPLOYERS SAVE MONEY BY OPTING OUT 
 
With this understanding of the more conventional risk financing 
structures for funding workplace injuries, it becomes apparent that there 
are essentially two ways that non-subscribers can reduce their workplace 
injury cost of risk. The first is for an employer to simply forgo providing 
any benefits and trust that its costs of defending and paying common law 
negligence claims will be lower than its cost of buying workers’ 
compensation insurance. The second is for an employer to entice its 
employees to waive their common law negligence claims or agree to 
arbitrate their injury claims in exchange for occupational injury benefits 
that are less costly than those that would be provided under workers’ 
compensation.  
 
A. Assuming the Risk of Negligence Claims 
  
Approximately 48 percent of non-subscribing Texas employers did not 
provide occupational injury benefits in 2008.200 Employees of these 
employers accounted for 18 percent of the “non-subscriber” workforce.201 
The question that states considering elective workers’ compensation need 
to answer is why nearly half of non-subscribing employers do not provide 
                                                 
196 See id. at 5.3-4 (describing the purpose and operation of self-insurance plans). 
197 See id. at 3.30 (discussing the purpose and operation of large deductible plans). 
198 See id. at 5.10 (describing the processes of regulatory filing for employers). 
199 See id. at 3.30 (discussing insured organizations’ obligations to provide security 
to insurers for large deductible plans). 
200 EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 23. 
201 Id. 
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occupational injury benefits. Part of the answer may be that over the years, 
partially through elimination of the common law defenses of assumption 
of risk, contributory negligence, and negligence of a fellow employee,202 
the Texas Legislature and courts have struck a balance: the negligence 
system is neither so favorable to employers that they all opt to take their 
chances in court nor so favorable to employees that no employer dares to 
opt out of the workers’ compensation system. An imbalance would 
quickly lead to a mass shift to the more favorable position.  
A look behind the numbers reveals, however, that there is something 
else going on. Small employers paid occupational benefits at a much lower 
rate than medium and large employers.203 There may be perfectly valid 
reasons for this split. For example, it may be that a certain critical mass of 
employees, payroll, or losses is required to make some types of 
occupational injury benefits economical. Nevertheless, this raises a serious 
concern about the ability of these employers to pay claims. As discussed 
supra in Part III, the traditional workers’ compensation risk financing 
mechanisms each account for the risk inability to pay claims.204 Where the 
risk is transferred to insurance companies, as in guaranteed cost and large 
deductible plans, insurer solvency regulations and state guaranty funds 
provide protection against this risk.205 Where the risk remains with the 
employer, as in self-insurance plans, the states protect against this risk by 
requiring financial reporting and collateral.206 The Texas opt-out system, 
however, provides no such guarantees that negligence claims against an 
employer will be paid. The cost of such unpaid claims will be borne by the 
injured employees and potentially by society as a whole through social 
safety net programs like Social Security and Medicaid. 
As a policy matter, this result should not be acceptable. Employers that 
retain the risk of negligence in lawsuits should not be any less accountable 
than those that retain the risk of workers’ compensation claims through a 
self-insurance plan. Accordingly, states considering elective workers’ 
compensation should subject non-subscribers to the same financial 
analysis and collateral requirements that they apply to self-insurers. Such 
requirements would likely preclude a large number of small employers 
from opting out, but they would ensure that those that are able to opt out 
are able to pay the negligence claims that ultimately arise.  
                                                 
202 See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (West 2009) (listing the defenses that are 
unavailable to employers). 
203 EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 24. 
204 See supra Part III (discussing workers’ compensation risk financing options). 
205 See supra Part III. 
206 See supra Part III. 
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Some would argue that the smallest employers, who are presently 
exempt from the workers’ compensation system not only in Texas, but 
also in several other states,207 should continue to be treated differently. 
The argument for this is that small employers, especially start-ups, often 
cannot afford large overhead expenses like a workers’ compensation 
policy, and they should be allowed to forgo this until they reach a critical 
mass of employees.208 While the premise that small businesses sometimes 
need extra help may be true, any such support should not be subsidized, as 
a matter of policy, by the injured worker or by the taxpayer when the 
worker exhausts his resources.  
 
B.  Exchanging a Waiver for Occupational Injury Benefits 
 
As discussed supra in Part II, among non-subscribing employers only 
a relatively small percentage pay medical (23 percent)209 and lost wage 
expenses (20 percent) for the entire duration of the employee’s injury.210 
Thus, the remainder of non-subscribers that pay occupational injury 
benefits essentially receive waivers of negligence claims or agreements to 
arbitrate211 in exchange for benefits that are inferior to those provided 
under the workers’ compensation system. As noted above, this is an 
exceedingly difficult problem for a state to solve directly because it is 
preempted by ERISA from regulating the benefit plan and by the FAA 
from regulating the contents of arbitration agreements.212 However, 
assuming a solution is found to the FAA preemption dilemma that would 
prevent employers from directly conditioning employment on acceptance 
of an arbitration and waiver agreement,213 the fact that the benefits traded 
for are inferior to those provided by workers’  compensation does not 
mean that such agreements would be either implicitly unfair or beyond the 
reach of the legislature. As long as an employer cannot condition em-
ployment on the execution of an arbitration agreement, the employee 
retains the power to forgo the occupational injury benefits offered by 
                                                 
207 EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION 2008, supra note 97, at 2. 
208 Id. at 3. 
209 See supra Part II.B. 
210 See supra Part II.B. 
211 See supra Part II.C. 
212 See supra Part II.C. 
213 See supra Part II.C. Concededly, states will be powerless to regulate the fairness 
of the benefit programs because such concessions are “traded” for without first obtaining 
a change to the FAA that would preclude preemption of statutory non-waiver provisions 
in the states’ labor and employment statutes. 
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refusing to sign the waiver or arbitration agreement. Such an employee 
would rely instead on the negligence remedy.  
An informed employee’s decision about whether to agree to this trade 
will depend on two factors: the generosity of the benefit plan and the 
employee’s likelihood of prevailing in negligence claims. Thus, the 
legislature in a state with elective workers’ compensation could indirectly 
regulate the contents of occupational injury plans by liberalizing or 
constricting the negligence remedy. If, for example, employers are 
providing skimpy benefits across the board, the legislature could respond 
by tweaking the employer’s liability statute to make recovery by plaintiffs 
more likely. Granting employees beefed up litigation power would 
indirectly induce employers to provide richer benefits in order to secure 
waivers of this power. This, of course, assumes informed employees. The 
extent to which employees are or can become informed about their rights 
to refuse to sign waivers or arbitration agreements is an empirical matter 
beyond the scope of this Note. This Note assumes that it would be 
possible, through the plaintiff’s bar, public service campaigns, and other 
means to make employees aware of their rights. 
While it is possible to see how this could work, the problem of the 
burden of unpaid claims remains. The majority of Texas non-subscribers 
did not cover medical expenses or lost wages for the entire duration of the 
injury.214 This means that claimants with injuries that outlast the 
durational or dollar limits of the employer’s benefit plan will carry the 
burden of funding their continued medical care and lost wages. Informed 
employees should be capable of assessing this risk when determining 
whether to trade their rights to negligence claims. Furthermore, they 
should be capable of funding this risk through personal disability 
insurance. Thus, as long as two key conditions exist, namely a credible 
threat of successful negligence litigation and an informed workforce, this 
trade will be fair in most cases.  
 
V. THE REAL BENEFIT OF ELECTIVE WORKERS’  COMPENSATION 
 
As noted above, there are fairly serious problems with the Texas 
elective workers’ compensation system. This Note has addressed potential 
solutions to some of these problems, but the question remains: why should 
a state move to an elective system that, outside of Texas, no other state has 
adopted? The answer to this question lies in the 23 percent and 20 percent 
                                                 
214 See supra Part II.B. 
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respectively of Texas non-subscribers that do pay medical expenses and 
wage replacement expenses for the entire duration of their employees’ 
injuries.215 These employers provide employees with substantially the 
same benefits as they would receive under workers’ compensation, and 
yet, they presumably do so at a lower cost.216 Benefits are strictly 
regulated for employers who opt into workers’ compensation, but those 
who opt out have the opportunity to innovate and come up with ways to 
provide substantially the same benefits for less money. This innovation 
allows these employers to compete more effectively and could, down the 
road, lead to cost reductions even for opt in employers when the 
innovative ideas become adopted by the regulators.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Texas’s elective workers’ compensation system, while not ready for 
off the shelf roll-out to other states, does provide a blueprint for a system 
other states could adopt to foster innovation and cost reduction in their 
workers’ compensation systems. States considering elective workers’ 
compensation systems would do well to start with Texas’s basic 
framework, with the following changes.  
First and foremost, states considering elective workers’ compensation 
would need to achieve a solution to the FAA preemption dilemma, most 
likely through lobbying for a change to the FAA to constrict the FAA's 
preemption of employment related non-waiver provisions. This would 
allow states to prevent employers from extracting pre-injury waivers from 
their employees. This is critical because if an employer can secure waivers 
from its employees before injuries, it can effectively neutralize the threat 
of negligence suits. It can thus secure the principal benefit of a workers’ 
compensation system, namely near immunity from employer’s liability 
lawsuits, while at the same time providing stingy or no benefits to the 
employees in return.   
Second, states that do move forward with elective workers’ 
compensation should require the same financial review and collateral 
requirements from non-subscribers as they do from self-insurers. This 
would ensure that workers who were injured through the negligence of 
their employers could count on their employers to have the financial 
                                                 
215 See supra Part II.B. 
216 This Note makes this assumption on the following basis: an employer who could 
pay workers' compensation benefits for less than the cost of an alternative benefits plan 
would certainly do so because it would gain the additional benefit of being absolved from 
unpredictable negligence litigation. 
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wherewithal to make them whole. Such requirements would be likely to 
preclude a large number of small employers from opting out, but they 
would ensure that those who are able to opt out are able to pay the 
negligence claims that ultimately arise. Subscribers already guarantee their 
ability to pay claims either through their insurance companies or through 
collateral. There is no good reason that non-subscribers should be exempt 
from such a requirement.  
Third, states considering elective workers’ compensation should 
consider liberalization of the negligence remedy, at least to the extent 
Texas already has in eliminating the common law defenses of assumption 
of risk, contributory negligence, and negligence of a fellow employee. 
This will encourage non-subscribers to offer generous occupational injury 
benefits in exchange for waivers or arbitration agreements.  
Finally, states considering elective workers’ compensation should en-
sure that employees of non-subscribers are on the same footing as 
employees of subscribers with respect to retaliatory discrimination and 
discharge. Without protection from retaliation, employers could deter use 
of their benefit programs by taking adverse employment actions against 
employees that have availed themselves of their benefits. 
Adopting an elective workers’ compensation system, with these 
modifications, is likely to foster innovation and cost reduction in the field 
of occupational injuries. Employers would be empowered to develop 
occupational injury benefit plans that are both sufficiently generous as to 
make it worthwhile for their employees to trade their right to negligence 
claims for these plans and less costly because of a reduced need to comply 
with workers’ compensation regulations. The cost savings employers 
could create would result in a competitive advantage for a state's 
employers and for the state itself in attracting employers.  
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